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RESEARCH ARTICLE
PEER INFLUENCE IN THE DIFFUSION OF IPHONE 3G
OVER A LARGE SOCIAL NETWORK1
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Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Palma de Cima, 1649-023 Lisbon, PORTUGAL 
Pedro Ferreira
Heinz College and Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, PA  15213-3890  U.S.A.  {pedrof@cmu.edu}
David Krackhardt
Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA  15213-3890  U.S.A.  {krack@cmu.edu}
In this paper, we study the effect of peer influence in the diffusion of the iPhone 3G across a number of commu-
nities sampled from a large dataset provided by a major European Mobile carrier in one country.  We identify
tight communities of users in which peer influence may play a role and use instrumental variables to control
for potential correlation between unobserved subscriber heterogeneity and friends’ adoption.  We provide
evidence that the propensity of a subscriber to adopt increases with the percentage of friends who have already
adopted.  During a period of 11 months, we estimate that 14 percent of iPhone 3Gs sold by this carrier were
due to peer influence.  This result is obtained after controlling for social clustering, gender, previous adoption
of mobile Internet data plans, ownership of technologically advanced handsets, and heterogeneity in the
regions where subscribers move during the day and spend most of their evenings.  This result remains quali-
tatively unchanged when we control for changes over time in the structure of the social network.  We provide
results from several policy experiments showing that, with this level of effect of peer influence, the carrier
would have hardly benefitted from using traditional marketing strategies to seed the iPhone 3G to benefit from
viral marketing.
Keywords:    Peer influence, homophily, diffusion, community identification, viral marketing
Introduction1
The pervasiveness of simple, small, and light handsets
changed the way people communicate.  The worldwide pene-
tration of mobile handsets grew from 12 percent in 2000 to 87
percent in 2011 (ITU 2011).  Smartphones accounted for a
significant part of this growth.  Their penetration was 65 per-
cent in the United States, 50 percent in Europe, and 29 per-
cent worldwide in 2011 (Vakulenko 2011).  The mobile
handset market is expected to reach $340 billion in revenues
by 2015.  Smartphones are expected to account for 75 percent
of this revenue, thus growing 24 percent per year on average
between 2010 and 2015.  In recent years, handsets have
become small computers.  Accordingly, their value has shifted
toward the software and the data services they provide (The
Economist 2011).  Manufacturers increasingly are bundling
1Ravi Bapna was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Sanjukta Smith
served as the associate editor.
The appendices for this paper are located in the “Online Supplements”
section of the MIS Quarterly’s website (http://www.misq.org).
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handsets with applications that generate positive network
externalities.  Examples include FaceTime and Google Talk,
which allow consumers to video-call over the Internet at no
cost.  However, FaceTime requires an Apple device and
Google Talk or a handset running Android.  Hence, the utility
derived from using these applications, and therefore the utility
associated with the respective handsets, increases with the
number of people that use them.  The seminal works by
Rohlfs (1974) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) show how the
number of consumers buying a product may generate positive
network externalities leading to the well-known S-shaped
curve.  This has been empirically demonstrated in several
instances such as automatic teller machines (Saloner and
Shepard 1995) and spreadsheet software (Brynjolfsson and
Kemerer 1996).  However, in the case of mobile commu-
nication products, and from the perspective of an individual,
who adopts the product is likely to be as important, if not
more, as how many people adopt because it is the exposure to
these products through friends that may significantly reduce
uncertainty and trigger adoption.2  Yet, the role of peer influ-
ence in the diffusion of telecommunication products has not
been largely explored.  Exceptions include the study of video-
conferencing (Tucker 2008), applications for personalized
news (Aral et al.,2009) and caller ring back tones (Ma et al.
2010).
The penetration of handsets has been measured per brand and
per country (Botelho and Pinto 2004; Doganoglu and Grzy-
bowski 2007; Gruber 2001) but the specific mechanisms by
which they diffuse have not been studied in detail.  However,
handsets are fundamental devices in the telecommunications
industry.  They are the gateways by which consumers talk to
each other and obtain access to information.  The whole busi-
ness of cell phone operators relies on spreading handsets
across consumers.  If peer influence shapes handset sales,
then carriers must place significant care and effort in targeting
the right early adopters while reaching critical mass.  If, on
the other hand, the effect of peer influence is only small, then
carriers are likely better off with mass marketing campaigns
instead of targeted advertising.
Diffusion denotes the dissemination of a trait, product, or
service within a social system (Strang and Soule 1998).  The
social system comprises the set of individuals, groups, and
institutions that might adopt the innovation.  The members of
the social system use communication channels, such as face-
to-face meetings, phone conversations and email messages, to
exchange information about the innovation being diffused
(Mahajan 1985, p. 7).  Diffusion can be caused by external
influence, by mechanisms internal to the social system, or by
both.  External triggers include, for example, policy require-
ments (Mahajan 1985, p. 15; Valente 1996a, p. 95) and mass
media (Valente 1996a, p. 81).  Internal mechanisms relate
mostly to how one’s adoption depends on the behavior of the
other members of the social system.  In this context, peer
influence arises as the dyadic process by which an individual
shapes her behavior, beliefs, or attitudes according to what the
other individuals in the social system think, express, or how
they behave (Leenders 2002).3
A number of studies use randomized experiments to identify
the effect of peer influence.  Aral and Walker (2011) show
evidence of contagious adoption of a Facebook application
that allows users to share comments related to the movie
industry.  They seed the application to about 10,000 users and
observe viral messaging.  Bapna and Umyarov (2014) use
Last.fm, a music-sharing website.  They award free premium
subscriptions to a random set of users and show that being
connected to users that subscribe to the premium service
increases the likelihood of acquiring this service.  Most
research on peer influence to date studies the diffusion of
cheap, or even free, digital goods.  However, it is not clear
how the results found in these studies extend to settings in
which consumers have to risk money to purchase physical
products.  While sometimes a good sold at a higher price is
perceived as being better (McConnell 1968; Shiv et al. 2005;
Stafford and Enis 1969), in other instances free goods may
seem superior (Shampanier et al. 2007).  It is, therefore,
unclear how price determines consumption and, more
importantly, how price mediates the effect of peer influence.
Empirical evidence on how information from friends may
shape the consumption of costly goods is still lacking.  This
is not surprising because it is difficult to run randomized
experiments with costly goods.  On one hand, consumers
would likely need to be compensated for the money they
spend.  On the other hand, it is hard to design such experi-
ments in dense network settings in which treated and control
2Peer influence  has been shown to play a significant role in many different 
contexts such as academic performance (Boucher et al. 2010; Carrell et al.
2009; Sacerdote 2001), smoking and drinking behavior (Case and Katz 1991;
Mercken et al. 2010), sexual conduct (Romer et al. 1994), trade unions
(Hedström 1994), vaccinations (Rao et al. 2007), new drugs (Burt 1987;
Coleman et al. 1966; Strang and Tuma 1993; Valente 1996a) and electronic
health records (Zheng et al. 2010).
3A broad range of mechanisms can drive peer influence (Leenders 2002;
Strang and Soule 1998; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001), such as information
transfer (when individuals get to know about the innovation through previous
adopters; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), competition (when individuals look at
their rivals as frames of reference), conformity  (when individuals comply
with the behavior and attitudes of the groups to which they belong; Menzel
1960), network externalities (when the utility of adopting an innovation 
increases with the number of adopters; Katz and Shapiro 1994), and spatial
proximity (the fact that geographical proximity facilitates all types of inter-
actions across individuals; Strang and Soule 1998).
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individuals connect, potentially contaminating results (Aral
and Walker 2011).  In these settings, a promising course of
action might be to try to tease out the effect of peer influence
from observational data (Aral 2010; Aral et al. 2009).  This,
however, is also hard to accomplish (Manski 1993; Van den
Bulte and Lilien 2001).  Difficulties arise, for example, when
one cannot identify the group to which each individual
belongs.  Today’s increased ability to collect data that cap-
tures the structure of the relationships among people faci-
litates identifying these groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Yet, collecting such data is expensive and only a handful of
studies, such as Anagnostopoulos et al. (2008) and Aral et al.
(2009), did so in large, real-world settings.  In addition, these
authors primarily look only at cheap digital goods.
Another difficulty in observational studies arises when
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals that influences
behavior also influences the formation of social ties (Aral et
al. 2009).  Peer effects models (Bramoulle et al. 2009;
Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012) and matching in
high resolution panels (Aral et al. 2009) have been used to
control for such unobservables.  Other approaches include
using structural models (Ma et al. 2010), propensity score
matching (Aral et al. 2009), randomization (Anagostopoulos
et al. 2009), and instrumental variables (Tucker 2008). 
Interestingly, identifying groups of users and controlling for
homophily are deeply interconnected.  In fact, homophily
suggests that social networks develop around groups of
individuals that share similar unobserved traits, often called
communities in the literature (Leskovec et al. 2009; Newman
2006).  Therefore, controlling for community structure may
help alleviate concerns with unobserved homophily (Shalizi
and Thomas 2011).  In particular, community membership
may capture part of the unobservables that determine network
structure, reducing the scope for unobserved characteristics
that influence behavior and determine the formation of ties
across individuals.  Once communities of users have been
identified, one can also use stochastic agent-based models to
describe the coevolution of adoption and of the formation of
social ties within and between communities (Snijders et al.
2010).  These models can also help separate the contribution
of homophily and peer influence for the diffusion of an
innovation across a social system.
Our paper is an observational study aimed at characterizing
the diffusion of the iPhone 3G in a large social network.  We
hypothesize that the likelihood of an individual adopting this
handset is associated with her level of exposure to it (Valente
1996a) through her friends (Leenders 2010; Valente 1996b).
This idea is in line with the arguments of Rogers (1995)
whereby interactions between non-adopters and adopters
mitigate the risk and uncertainty associated with the innova-
tion, increasing the likelihood of adoption.  As such, our
paper contributes to the set of IS literature that identifies peer
effects in the adoption of technology in several new ways.
First, we study the effect of peer influence with a costly
physical good.  This complements the current literature
looking at peer influence with cheap digital goods.  Second,
we do so in the context of a large social network from which
we identify tight communities of individuals.  In particular,
we develop a new algorithm to identify communities with
adopters when adoption is a rare event.  This algorithm may
inspire other researchers to study influence with costly goods,
in which case adoption is likely to be limited.  Third, we
combine community identification with instrumental variables
to identify the effect of peer influence.  We also use agent-
based modeling to measure this effect with a time-varying
social network.  Finally, we provide results from policy simu-
lations characterizing the virality of this handset.4
We use a large dataset from a major European mobile carrier
in one country, hereinafter called EuroMobile, to identify the
effect of peer influence in the diffusion of the iPhone 3G.
This is an expensive handset in the country analyzed and
therefore it is unclear whether peer influence can affect its
sales.  We analyze call detailed records (CDRs) from
thousands of users, their friends, and friends of their friends,
between August 2008 and June 2009 to model their social
network.  We then explore the structure of this social network
to identify the effect of peer influence.  We combine com-
munity identification (Newman and Girvan 2004) with
instrumental variables to alleviate endogeneity concerns.  In
particular, we instrument friends’ adoption with the adoption
of the friends of friends that are not friends of the ego and that
live in a city different from that where the ego does to alle-
viate endogeneity concerns.  We also use stochastic agent-
based models (Snijders et al. 2010) to look at how the
evolution of the social network over time correlates to the
adoption of the iPhone 3G.
We find that if all friends adopt the iPhone 3G, then the
probability of the ego to adopt increases by 15 percent on
average.  We obtain this result after controlling for hetero-
geneity across regions, across subscribers, and over time.
This result is robust across specifications including different
approaches to define our instruments as well as different ways
to code the adjacency matrix across subscribers.  We also
show that peer influence accounted for roughly 14 percent of
iPhone 3G sales during the first 11 months at EuroMobile.
We provide results from several policy simulations showing
4In addition, our paper also complements the literature that measures the
penetration of handsets in countries such as  Germany (Singh 2008), India
(Chu et al. 2009), Japan (Park and Ueda 2011), Korean (Park and Ueda
2011), Portugal (Botelho and Pinto 2004), and Taiwan (Chu et al. 2009),
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that EuroMobile would have hardly benefitted from seeding
the iPhone 3G to increase its penetration in light of the
modest magnitude for the effect of peer influence that we find
in this paper.  This finding, however, depends highly on how
much of the handset is subsidized to the seeds.  In this regard,
our paper contributes to improve our understanding of the
potential of viral marketing (Leskovec et al. 2007; Watts et al.
2007) for costly products.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next
section introduces EuroMobile and discusses the release of
the iPhone 3G.  The subsequent section describes our ap-
proach to identify communities of users.  We then introduce
our model and empirical strategy, after which we present our
results and robustness checks.  Following that, we show the
results from policy simulations and, finally, present our
conclusions.
Mobile Carrier and the Release
of iPhone 3G
Our industrial partner EuroMobile is the market leader of
mobile services in this country.  EuroMobile granted us
access to all its detailed call records (CDRs) in one European
country between August 2008 and June 2009.  EuroMobile
released the iPhone 3G in this country in July 2008.  For
every call placed or received by a EuroMobile subscriber, we
have the anonimized phone numbers of the initiator and
recipient, the GPS coordinates for the cell towers used, a
timestamp, and the duration of the call.  For every sent text
message (sms) initiated or received by a EuroMobile sub-
scriber, we have the anonimized phone numbers of the
initiator and recipient and a timestamp.  We also have a set of
subscriber characteristics such as date of birth, gender, type
of contract, tariff plan, handset, zip code for the account
owner, and changes in all these covariates over time.  Our
dataset spans 5 million active phone numbers.  We have about
3.7 billion calls and 13 billion sms in this dataset.
The Social Network Graph
We use all CDRs in this dataset to define an undirected graph
of communications across EuroMobile subscribers.  We
trimmed subscribers from other providers because we did not
have sufficient information on them, such as whether they
adopted the iPhone 3G.  An edge between two EuroMobile
subscribers is added to our graph if one of them called or sent
an sms to the other and the latter answered back with a call or
an sms within the same calendar month.  This procedure dis-
regards communications that are unlikely to proxy social
proximity such as those involving message bots, short
numbers, and call centers.5
The resulting graph includes 4,986,313 subscribers and
57,069,798 edges.  The undirected graph density is
4.59 * 10!6 and the mean degree is 22.9 with a standard
deviation of 25.5.  The median degree is 13.  Figure 1 plots
the empirical degree distribution for EuroMobile subscribers.
We say that two EuroMobile subscribers are friends if they
are connected through an edge in this graph.  Hereafter, the
number of friends of a EuroMobile subscriber is her degree.
The Release of the iPhone 3G
EuroMobile released the iPhone 3G in the country analyzed
in July 2008.  This was the first Apple smartphone commer-
cialized in this country.6  Smartphones accounted only for 11
percent of all handset sales during 2008.  Figure 2 shows that
ease of use, price, size, and weight were among the most
important factors that consumers in this country considered
when purchasing a handset.  However, the iPhone 3G was a
conspicuous luxury product in this market.  The 8Gb model
launched for 500 Euros without a contract with a carrier.7
Furthermore, subscribers could only benefit from its full
potential if they subscribed to a data plan.  Figure 2 shows
that in 2008 consumers in this country did not care much for
Internet connectivity or network coverage on their handset.
These facts suggest that there was significant uncertainty
about the iPhone 3G, which likely motivated consumers to
seek opinions from their friends.  Therefore, the case of the
iPhone 3G in this country in 2008 provides an appropriate
setting to study the potential effect of peer influence.  During
the first 11 months in the market, less than 1 percent of
EuroMobile subscribers adopted the iPhone 3G.
5We also removed from our analysis phone numbers that switched between
pre-paid and post-paid because in these cases we are unable to track their
history reliably.   These operations eliminate less than 5 percent of the sub-
scribers.  We also trim from this graph subscribers whose degree is three
standard deviations above the mean.  This removes private branch machines
(which only route calls among the internal telephones of an organization) 
and ensures that the size of our graph is computationally manageable.  This
eliminates less than 1.6 percent of the subscribers.
6At that time, Nokia was the preferred mobile phone brand with a market
share above 40 percent, followed  closely by Samsung.  LG, and Sony, each
with roughly a 10 percent market share.
7Prices ranged between 130 and 400 Euros with contracts.  Contracts would
last for 24 months and significant penalties applied to terminate them before
expiry.  All iPhones were sold with a SW lock to the carrier selling the
device.  This could be unlocked at no charge after 24 months or before 24
months for a 200 Euro fee.  Monthly contract fees ranged between 30 and 65
Euros across carriers.  People in this country spent 20 Euros per month on
average for mobile communications during 2008.
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Note:  Grey dots represent subscribers whose degree is three standard deviations below the mean.
Figure 1.  Degree Distribution across EuroMobile Subscribers
Note:  Percent of total respondents who checked each particular characteristic.
Figure 2.  Most Important Characteristics Considered When Purchasing a New Handset
Working with Communities
Peer influence is a local phenomenon.  It measures whether
peers play a part in someone’s decision to undertake actions. 
For this reason, peer influence is likely to occur within com-
munities of friends, that is, groups of people with many
connections within the group and only a few connections to
people outside the group.  We argue that in order to study
peer influence one must identify tight communities of
individuals in which peer influence can be meaningful instead
of looking for average peer influence effects across large
networks of people which are unlikely to embed real social
meaning.  In this paper, we aim at studying how friends
influence one’s decision to purchase the iPhone 3G but con-
trolling for the fact that potential influence occurs within the
scope of communities of friends.  For this purpose, we focus
MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 4/December 2014 1107
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on communities with about 100 people, which according to
Leskovec et al. (2009) is the size beyond which clusters tend
to start blending into a giant component of the social graph
and thus start to lose social meaning.
Furthermore, identifying communities of subscribers yields
additional empirical advantages.  For example, social net-
works tend to aggregate individuals that share common
unobserved traits.  These latent unobservables confound the
identification of peer influence.  Yet, community membership
is likely to capture part of the unobservables that determine
network structure and, at the same time, drive behavior.
Thus, controlling for community membership is likely to help
control for unobserved homophily (Shalizi and Thomas 2011).
Estimating peer effects on a community basis is also likely to
reduce the downward bias that may arise from considering
large networks of consumers.  To see this, consider two com-
munities, one completely immune to a disease and the other
vulnerable to it.  Introducing sick individuals into the former
would lead us to think that the disease is not contagious.
Introducing sick individuals into the latter would allow us to
determine the rate of contagion.  Studying contagion in this
population as a whole would underestimate the virulence of
the disease.  Firms are typically interested in measuring peer
effects in communities that are likely to purchase their pro-
ducts.  In fact, they tailor their products to market segments
separately in ways they believe might accelerate sales.  From
a managerial point of view, one is not interested in overall
peer effects but rather in local influence effects.  In the case
of the expensive iPhone 3G, subscribers susceptible to
adopting this handset might be very different from the average
EuroMobile subscriber.  Our interest is in identifying peer
influence among adopters.
Finally, identifying communities also permits working with
samples of independent, cohesive groups of consumers, which
can be used to correct standard errors and avoid claiming
effects when there might be none.  Treating observations as
independent and identically distributed when dealing with
social network data is a major drawback of many empirical
analyses which we try to limit in this paper.
Algorithms to Identify Communities
Table 1, based on the survey in Fortunato (2010), provides a
list of algorithms used in the literature to identify commu-
nities in social graphs.  Most of these algorithms cannot be
applied to large social networks due to their computational
complexity.  The comparative studies in Pons and Latapy
(2006), Lancichinetti et al. (2008), and Lancichinetti and
Fortunato (2009) show clearly that the first 10 algorithms in
this table are unable to process a network with 5 million
nodes and 57 million edges.  For this reason, in this paper, we
focus on algorithms 11 to 15.
Most of the algorithms in this table are based on greedy opti-
mizations of the modularity index.8  However, as Fortunato
and Barthelemy (2007) show, this index has a resolution limit
and fails to identify small communities in large social graphs.
Therefore, we do not use modularity in our case.  Not only is
our network very large but our interest resides in identifying
tight and small communities where peer influence can have
real social meaning.  Instead, we use the internal external ratio
(IER) introduced in Krackhardt and Stern (1988) to measure
the cohesiveness of communities.  In our case, IER = (I ! E)/
(I + E), where I denotes the number of calls and sms
exchanged by individuals within the community and E
denotes the number of calls and sms exchanged with indi-
viduals outside the community.9  IER balances the effort that
individuals place in maintaining friendships within versus
outside the community (I ! E).  In this regard, it is a good
measure of the relative investment that individuals place in
connecting with people within their community.  Also, IER
measures this effort relative to all of the effort that individuals
place in maintaining friendships (I + E).  Therefore, IER also
controls well for the heterogeneity in the effort to manage
friendships across individuals.
Table 2 shows that the algorithms used to identify commu-
nities introduced above perform poorly when applied to our
graph.  Columns 4 to 7 show that more than half of the com-
munities identified have at most 2 people.  Column 6 shows
that most individuals are placed in large communities, which
are unlikely to entail social meaning.  Columns 8 to 14 show
that if one limits the analysis to communities with 25 to 200
people, then few of them have adopters.  Columns 15 and 16
show that if one further limits the analysis to communities
with positive IERs, then one is left with virtually no adopters. 
In sum, the communities identified by these algorithms can
hardly be used to study peer influence with rare events.
8 Modularity compares the number of edges within a given community  to the
number of edges that this community would have if network ties had been
randomly established.  Therefore, it assumes that any two people in the
network can connect.  This, however, is unlikely as networks grow.
9IER varies in [!1, +1].  The lower bound is attained when all commu-
nication involves individuals outside the community.  The upper bound is
attained when all communication remains within the community.  The higher
the IER, the more isolated the community.  Negative IERs identify poor
communities, in the sense that in such communities people talk more often
to people outside the community rather than to people inside the community.
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Table 1.  Community Detection Algorithms and Their Computational Complexity
# Authors Computational Complexity
1 Palla et al. (2005) O(exp(n))
2 Newman and Girvan (2004) O(m2n)
3 Girvan and  Newman (2002) O(mn2)
4 Furtunato et al. (2004) O(n4)
5 Bragow and  Bollt (2004) O(n3)
6 Donetti and Munoz (2005) O(n2)
7 Zhou and Lipowsky (2005) O(n2)
8 Duch and Arenas (2005) O(n2log(n))
9 Radicchi et al. (2004) O(n2)
10 Newman (2003) O(n2)
11 Zhang et al. (2011) O(n2c (nc + nb))
12 Pons and Latapy (2006) O(n2log(n))
13 Clauset et al. (2004) O(nlog2 (n))
14 Blondel et al. (2008) O(m)
15 Rosvall and Bergstrom (2008) O(m)
Note 1:  Adapted from Fortunato (2010).  Note 2:  n denotes the number of nodes in the social network, m denotes the number of edges in the
social network, nc denotes the target number of nodes in the subpopulation of interest, nb denotes the number of nodes in the boundary of the sub-
population of interest.
Table 2.  Summary of Results Obtained with Community Detection Algorithms
All Communities Communities with Size between 25 and 200 IER > 0
Column
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al. (2008)








Yes 4 hours 8,081 2 2 2,490,201 617.6 14 0 10 0.000 0 0 0 10 0
Clauset et
al. (2004)
Yes 1 month 25,373 2 2 317,426 179.3 232 17 37 0.159 0 0 3 21 0
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Table 3.  Summary of Results Obtained Using the Modified T-CLAP Algorithms
All Communities Communities with Size between 25 and 200 IER > 0
Column








































































2,134 2 103 115 96.7 2,134 1,936 72,995 36.5 0 16 115 263 1,758
A Modified Version of T-CLAP
We devise an alternative algorithm to extract communities
from our large social network.  This algorithm is inspired in
T-CLAP (Zhang and Krackhardt 2010), which was previously
used in the literature to identify small and tight communities. 
T-CLAP does not consider the entire social graph.  Instead, it
snowballs from a random seed and prunes nodes according to
their IER.  However, in our case, randomly sampling seeds is
unlikely to ever hit an iPhone 3G adopter.10
Therefore, we change T-CLAP to (1) snowball starting from
an iPhone 3G adopter, and (2) to discard non-adopters with
higher probability.  Appendix A shows the pseudocode for
our modified version of T-CLAP.  Note that in our version of
this algorithm, if pruning a community results in two or more
disjoint communities, then we proceed using the community
with the highest IER.  This helps us find communities with
high IERs.
The computational complexity of T-CLAP is O(n2c(nc + nb)),
where nc denotes the number of nodes in the subpopulation of
interest and nb denotes the number of nodes in the boundary
of this subpopulation.  Our modified version of T-CLAP is
simpler because it skips clustering.  In this case it takes O(nc)
time to create the graph with the subpopulation of interest
using snowball sampling.  Computing IERs takes linear time
on both nc and the number of edges originating and reaching
the subpopulation of interest, which we call mc.  Thus, our
modified version of T-CLAP would take O(n(nc + mc)) time
to run in a network with n users.  The majority of our code to
identify communities is developed in R, making use of iGraph
(Csardi and Nepusz 2005).11
Communities Identified Using the New T-CLAP
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the communities iden-
tified using our modified version of T-CLAP.  We identify
2,134 communities comprising 72,995 adopters.  More than
90 percent of these communities have adopters.  We filter
these communities and keep the ones that do not overlap,
have at least one adopter, and positive IER.  We are left with
263 communities comprising 1,758 adopters, which we use in
the remainder of this paper.  Figure 3 shows that there is no
particular relationship between the size, the density, and the
IER of these 263 communities.
Furthermore, these 263 communities are quite disconnected
from each other.  To see this, we select two communities at
random and, also at random, we select one subscriber in each
of these communities.  We compute the length of the shortest
path between these subscribers and repeat this process
500,000 times.  Figure 4 shows the empirical distribution for
the length of the shortest paths.  The average length is 4.76
edges with a standard deviation of 0.66.
We also look at whether subscribers have friends in other
communities.  We perform a 1-wave snowball sample from all
subscribers in these 263 communities and look for inter-
sections.  Figure 5 shows that more than 75 percent of the
subscribers have no friends in other communities and 95 per-
10Recall that the adoption rate of the iPhone 3G was less than 1 percent in the
country we analyze.
11The majority of our figures are generated using ggplot (Wickham 2009) and
our tables are formatted using stargazer (Hlavac 2013).
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Figure 3.  IER, Size, and Density for the Communities Extracted with the Modified T-CLAP
Figure 4.  Length of the Shortest Path between Random Subscribers in Distinct Communities
cent have at most one friend in another community.  On
average, a community connects to 27.1 friends in other
communities. The latter belong to 18.4 communities on
average.  Figure 6 shows the distribution of the average
number of links that tie communities to each other.  The
overall average number of edges between two communities is
1.5 with a standard deviation of 0.6.12  Taken together, these
statistics show that these 263 communities are only sparsely
connected.
Model and Empirical Strategy
Consumer Utility Model
Let Uit represent the difference in utility for subscriber i
between adopting and not adopting the iPhone 3G at time t. 
We assume that Uit is given by the following reduced form
equation:
Uit = α + Xiβ + Zit γ + ρWiYt ! 1 + εit (1)
Xi and Zit are time invariant and time variant subscriber-
specific characteristics, respectively.  W is an adjacency
matrix.  Entry wij is zero when subscribers i and j are not
12An undirected graph with 263 communities as nodes could have at most
34,453 edges.  Only 7 percent of these edges are present in our case and 75
percent of them comprise only one edge between subscribers in the commu-
nities they connect.
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Figure 5.  Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Friends that Belong to Other Communities
Figure 6.  Distribution of the Average Number of Links Tying Communities
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics of Time Invariant Covariates
Variable Description Mean Std.  Dev.
genderM 1 for male 0.209 0.406
genderF 1 for female 0.185 0.388
genderU 1 for subscribers who did not report a gender 0.605 0.489
prepaid 1 if subscriber i had a prepaid tariff on June 30, 2008 0.606 0.489
mobileNet 1 if subscriber i had a mobile internet on June 30, 2008 0.023 0.150
phone2.0g 1 for ownership of a 2.0G handset on June 30, 2008 0.157 0.363
phone2.5g 1 for ownership of a 2.5G handset on June 30, 2008 0.478 0.499
phone3.0g 1 for ownership of a 3.0G handset on June 30, 2008 0.331 0.470
phone3.5g 1 for ownership of a 3.5G handset on June 30, 2008 0.028 0.166
phoneOther 1 for ownership of a handset with unknown range on June 30, 2008 0.004 0.066
phoneAge Number of years a subscriber used the owned handset on June 30, 2008
(before the iPhone 3G release)
0.790 0.716
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Figure 7.  Box Plot for the Proportion of Friend Adopters Over Time
friends and the inverse of the degree of subscriber i otherwise. 
Wi is the i
th row of W and Yt ! 1 is a column vector that stacks
the adoption decisions of all individuals up to time t ! 1.  εit
is the idiosyncratic error term.  User i adopts the iPhone 3G
at time t iff Uit > 0.  Therefore, Yit = 1{Uit > 0}.  The term
α + Xiβ + Zitγ captures the intrinsic utility of subscriber i from
adopting the iPhone 3G.  Parameter ρ measures the effect of
peer influence.  If ρ > 0, adoption increases with the number
of friends that adopt as well as with the number of friends of
friends that adopt recursively, which in turn increases the
propensity to adopt.  In this case, this model originates the
well-known s-shape diffusion curve as times goes by.  If,
however, ρ # 0 and the intrinsic utility to adopt the iPhone 3G
is small, few people will adopt and the handset will not spread
largely across the population.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the covariates used
in our model.  We control for gender, for the sophistication
of the handset owned prior to the release of the iPhone 3G,
for how long the subscriber owned that handset, for the type
of tariff plan subscribed, and for how long the subscriber
has been with EuroMobile (tenure).13  Figure 7 details the
evolution of the proportion of friends that adopted the iPhone
3G over the period of analysis.
Identification Strategy
Allison (1982) and Tucker (2008) discuss how the model in
equation 1 can be empirically estimated with pooled probit as
long as the standard errors are adjusted to account for
correlation in the error term using either a sandwich estimator
or block bootstrap.14  However, unobserved heterogeneity
may bias our estimates of peer influence.  This happens, in
particular, if Ei[WiYt!1, εit] … 0; that is, if unobserved reasons
that lead subscriber i to adopt the iPhone 3G relate to the
reasons why she befriends other subscribers.  We refer to this
condition as 1-hop homophily.  Our approach to deal with this
problem is twofold.  First, we use many controls to reduce the
potential relevant unobserved effects in εit.  We control for
heterogeneity across regions, across subscribers, and over
time.  Subscribers living in large cities are likely to face lower
13Gender has been shown to play an important role in how people perceive
the benefit of a new technology (Gefen and Straub 1997; Venkatesh and
Morris 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2003).  Prior studies have also shown that
experience with technologies similar to the new product increases the
likelihood of adoption (Karahanna et al. 2006; Venkatesh et al. 2003).
Therefore, in our case, we would expect subscribers with more sophisticated
handsets to be more likely to adopt the iPhone 3G.  We also control for how
long the subscriber has that handset to account, for example, for the sub-
scriber’s propensity to be an early adopter.  We control for tariff plan because
post-paid subscribers are typically wealthier.  Finally, tenure might proxy
how much the subscriber trusts EuroMobile  in order to acquire a new and
expensive handset from it.
14To do so, the data must be organized into a panel and observations after the
first adoption need to be removed from the sample.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 4/December 2014 1113
This content downloaded from 
              158.162.0.2 on Tue, 10 Nov 2020 10:08:28 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Godinho de Matos et al./Peer Influence in a Large Social Network




geoWageV L 1 if the user spends most days in regions where salaries are 2 standard
deviations below the national average
0.001 0.065
geoWageL 1 if the user spends most days in regions were salaries are between 1 and 2
standard deviations below the national average
0.009 0.095
geoWageA 1 if the user spends most days in regions within 1 standard deviation of the
national average
0.312 0.463
geoWageH 1 if the user spends most days in regions were salaries are between 1 and 2
standard deviations above the national average
0.439 0.496







Zio_Code_FE Dummy variables for home zip code 70 342.3 521.8
Community_FE Dummy variables for community membership 263 91.7 17.2
Month_FE Dummy variables for each month 12 23,064 532.8
Note 1:  Regions are studied at municipal level and daytime is 8 a.m. – 8 p.m.
search costs because the iPhone 3G was mostly available
from EuroMobile franchises located in major shopping malls.
Subscribers in these cities may also find it more beneficial to
use the iPhone 3G because network coverage is likely to be
better in urban areas to support Internet access.  We use
regional dummies to control for these effects.  We account for
where subscribers live, which we identify from the zip code
of the account holder, and for where they spend most of their
daytime, which we identify from the GPS coordinates of the
cell towers used to route calls between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. that
we match to wage information obtained from the last Census. 
Yet, and as described by Manski (1993) and Shalizi and
Thomas (2011), unobservable group effects may still lead to
the adoption of the iPhone 3G and confound our estimates of
peer influence.15  We include community dummies to help
control for these effects.  These dummies capture some of the
unobserved homophily reducing the potential for unobserv-
ables that drive both network formation and adoption of the
iPhone 3G.  Finally, we add time dummies to control for the
fact that the net benefit from adopting the iPhone 3G changes
over time with seasonal promotions and declining price
trends. Table 5 summarizes the dummy variables mentioned
earlier.
Second, we explore the structure of the social network to
derive an instrumental variable at the subscriber level and
thus further alleviate endogeneity concerns.  Consider two
subscribers, i and j, who are friends.  Consider a third sub-
scriber, k, who is a friend of subscriber j but not of subscriber
i.  We argue that subscriber k’s decision to adopt the iPhone
3G relates to subscriber j’s decision to do so and to subscriber
i’s decision to do so only through subscriber j’s decision. 
Subscriber k’s decision to adopt the iPhone 3G is correlated
to subscriber j’s decision to do so.  Subscriber j becomes
exposed to the iPhone 3G through her friends, which reduces
her uncertainty about the utility of the new handset and thus
increases her likelihood to adopt it.  Furthermore, subscriber
k’s and subscriber j’s decisions to adopt are correlated due to
1-hop homophily, which has been widely reported to arise in
social networks (McPherson et al. 2001).  Finally, even if our
communities fail to exhibit 1-hop homophily, our instrument
is algebraically related to our dependent endogenous variable
by construction.16
15One example is a set of subscribers that communicates frequently within
the group because they work for the same company and the company adopts
the iPhone 3G (or another handset, for that matter) as the primary  handset for
its employees.
16To see this, note that W² codifies the friends of friends and (1 ! W)W² the
friends of friends not friends of the ego.  Therefore, both the instrument and
the endogenous variable depend on W.  According to Bramoulle et al. (2009),
this type of instrument can provide identification as long as I, W, and W² are
linearly independent, which is the case in our data.
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for the Instrumental Variable
Variable Description Mean Std.  Dev.
ffnf_adopterst!1 Proportion of friends not friends of the ego who adopted the iPhone 3G 0.009 0.011
ffnfdc_adopterst!1 Proportion of friends not friends of the ego who live in a city different from
where the ego who adopted the iPhone 3G does
0.010 0.009
N_ff Number of friends of friends 1333.279 1081.448
N_ffnf Number of friends of friends not friends 1311.574 1064.555
N_ffnfdc Number of friends of friends not friends of the ego living in a city different
from where the ego does
566.580 586.7173
Note 1:  Mean and standard deviation for the time varying instruments were calculated considering the entire panel.  Note 2:  Mean and standard
deviation for time invariant covariates is calculated over the subscribers in the sample.
However, our instrument only works properly if, in addition,
we assume that Ei[W
2
iYt!1, εit] = 0.  We refer to this condition
as absence of 2-hop homophily.  We note that 1-hop
homophily does not necessarily entail 2-hop homophily.17
Yet, 2-hop homophily may still be present in our data.  We
address this concern in several ways.  We only use the deci-
sion to adopt the iPhone 3G of the friends of friends of the
ego not friends of the ego.  This provides additional separa-
tion between our instrument and our dependent variable,
which helps reduce the potential correlation between sub-
scriber i’s and subscriber k’s decisions to adopt the iPhone 3G
to that arising only through subscriber j’s decision.  We also
introduce geographical separation between subscriber i and
subscriber k to further lessen the likelihood of shared
unobserved homophily.  We used the GPS coordinates of the
cell towers used to route calls to identify the cities where
subscribers live.  Appendix B provides additional details of
how this has been accomplished.  We used only the adoption
decisions of friends of friends of the ego that are not friends
of the ego and that live in a city different from where the ego
does as instruments.  Previous literature has shown that
geographic proximity facilitates interactions (Strang and
Soule 1998) and that the frequency of both face-to-face and
electronic interactions reduce with geographic separation
(Tillema et al. 2010).  Clearly, using instruments that are not
friends of the ego and that are geographically far apart from
the latter lessens significantly the opportunities for correlated
unobserved homophily.  Combining social network data with
geography is an innovative approach to identification unique
to our paper that we could pursue given the richness of our
dataset.  In our section on robustness checks, we discuss other
strategies to find additional instruments and use them to
provide additional results.
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for our instrumental
variable, which is computed before applying T-CLAP.
Finally, we note that our identification strategy with IV intro-
duces limitations for inference purposes.  In short, we need to
restrict the population in which we measure the effect of peer
influence because we have no evidence that this effect is the
same across all subscribers in our communities.  In our case,
we can look at treated egos as subscribers i with friends,
subscribers j, that adopted the iPhone 3G and we can think of
compliers as subscribers j that do not adopt the iPhone 3G
when their friends, subscribers k, do not and that adopt the
iPhone 3G when their friends (subscribers k) do.  Refer to
Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist et al. (1996), and
Wooldridge and Imbens (2007) for more details on these
concepts.  With one-side non-compliance (Bloom 1984), that
is, when subscribers j do not adopt the iPhone 3G if their
friends (subscribers k) do not, we can identify the effect of
peer influence in the subpopulation of friends of compliers.
Subscribers j and subscribers k do not adopt the iPhone 3G in
15 percent of our observations.  Only in 0.14 percent of obser-
vations did we see subscribers j adopt the iPhone 3G when
subscribers k did not.  Therefore, we find strong evidence of
one-side non-compliance in our case.  Now, note that the sub-
population of friends of compliers, in which we can identify
the effect of peer influence, is by definition the subpopulation
receiving treatment.  Therefore, in our case, the measure of
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the
average partial effect (APE), reported in the next sections,
should be interpreted along these lines.  We note that
reporting treatment effects in a subpopulation of interest is not
unique to our paper.  For example, Aral and Walker (2011)
report the ATT while Bapna and Umyarov (2014) study the
ATE on the non-treated.
17If it did, one could possibly use the decision to adopt the iPhone 3G of the
friends of friends of friends not friends of the ego as an instrument.   One
could possibly use this idea recursively to further reduce the potential bias in
the effect of peer influence.  Yet, too many hops between egos and instru-
ments may result in weak instruments.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 4/December 2014 1115
This content downloaded from 
              158.162.0.2 on Tue, 10 Nov 2020 10:08:28 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Godinho de Matos et al./Peer Influence in a Large Social Network

















Observations 265,462 265,462 265,462
Community FE No No Yes
Zip Code FE No Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.117 0.157








***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis.
A Results for Peer Influence
Probit Results
Table 7 shows the results obtained without instruments.18  We
only show results for the covariate of interest.  All other co-
variates behave as expected, as shown in Appendix D.  All
specifications in this table show a positive correlation
between friends’ adoption and the ego’s adoption, as ex-
pected.  The Average Partial Effect (APE) varies between 4.5
percent and 5.3 percent.19  The magnitude of the coefficient
reduces from Column (2) to Column (3) when we include
community dummies.  This provides evidence that using
communities is potentially capturing some homophily that
could otherwise be interpreted as influence.  As such, this
result provides support in favor of using communities to
measure peer influence in social networks.
IV Probit Results
Table 8 shows the results obtained after instrumentation.20
The results in this table provide clear evidence of contagious
adoption.  If all friends of the ego adopt the iPhone 3G then
the ego’s probability to adopt increases by 15 percent.  Figure
8 shows that this level of peer influence must have accounted
for approximately 14 percent of all iPhone 3G adoption
during our period of analysis.  Table E1 in Appendix E shows
the pseudocode of the algorithm used to compute this statistic.
We note that the marginal effect of peer influence increases
significantly after instrumentation.  Budget constraints might
explain this increase.  People in the same household tend to
call each other often and therefore will appear as friends in
our social graph.
However, budget constraints might preclude all family mem-
bers from adopting the new and expensive iPhone 3G.  Family
members are friends that will not adopt the iPhone 3G even if
they want to.  This artifact may downplay the estimates of
peer influence before instrumentation because it leads the
error term to be negatively correlated to our endogenous
variable.
18We use 265,462 observations over 258 communities out of the 263
identified previously.  Appendix C discusses why five communities were
dropped from the analysis.
19For the probit estimator, APE is given by the partial derivative of the
expected value function, E [Φ(α + Zδ)].  The standard errors for the APE are
computed using the Delta method  as suggested in Wooldridge (2002).
20In the case of IV probit, and following Wooldridge (2002, p.  475), the APE
is obtained from the partial derivative of Ev[αp + Zδp + θpv].  Subscript p
indicates that IV probit estimates parameters up to a scale factor.  Subscript
v denotes the residuals of the first stage regression.  For more details on the
Newey IV estimator and how to compute APE refer to Wooldridge and
Imbens (2007), which also describes in detail how to average out effects over
time.
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Community FE Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes
χ² p-value 0.000 0.000
APE 0.120*** 0.150***
[0.018] [0.032]
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Newey estimator standard errors in ( ) for IV probit.  Note 2:  Community block-bootstrap standard errors in [ ] for IV probit (200 replications
are used to calculate the significance level.
Figure 8.  The Role of Peer Influence in the Adoption of the iPhone 3G
To better understand the potential effect of budget constraints,
we assume that all phone numbers in the same billing account
belong to the same person, to people in the same family, or to
employees of the same firm.21
On average, more than 20 percent of one’s friends belong to
the same account and therefore intra-account communication
is significant.  Figure 9 plots the number of iPhone 3G
adopters in accounts with more than one and less than six
phone numbers, most likely associated with families.  Most
accounts have only one adopter, which is consistent with the
hypothesis of budget constraints.  A similar plot is obtained
for accounts with more than five phone numbers, most likely
associated with firms.  This reinforces the hypothesis of bud-
get get constraints and shows that only a few firms, if at all,
adopted the iPhone 3G.
21Nothing prevents unrelated subscribers from sharing a common phone bill,
but these cases are likely exceptions.
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Figure 9.  Adopters per Account for Accounts with Two to Five People
Robustness Checks
Functional Form
Instrumental variables with linear probability models (LPM)
rely on less restrictive assumptions on the distribution of the
error term than nonlinear formulations.  According to Allison
(1982) and Wooldridge (2002), LPM estimates are often good
approximations to the average partial effect in the population.
Therefore, we estimate LPM versions of the model in equa-
tion (1).
Table 9 shows the results obtained.  Both the OLS result, in
Column (1), and the 2SLS results, in Columns (2) and (3),
remain positive and highly statistically significant.  Further-
more, they are not statistically different from their probit
counterparts.  Therefore, our results for the effect of peer
influence do not seem to be an artifact of functional form.
Effect of the Period of Analysis
The iPhone 3G is a big ticket item, in particular in the market
studied in our paper, which can introduce friction into the
process of peer influence.  Therefore, a month-long window
seems appropriate to analyze the effect of peer influence.  In
any case, this might bias our estimates downward, for
example, by increasing the potential for contemporaneous
peer influence, for which we may fail to account.  We repro-
duce our results with weekly binning to check whether our
choice of period of analysis can be driving our results.  Table
10 shows the results obtained for OLS, 2SLS, probit, and IV
probit using weekly binning.  These effects are four times
smaller than the effects obtained with monthly binning, which
suggests that our choice of period of analysis does not seem
to drive our findings.
Alternative Weighting Matrices
In the preceding sections, W was a row standardized version
of the adjacency matrix coding the social graph giving the
same weight to every friend.  However, it is likely that
subscribers weight differently the information they obtain
about the iPhone 3G from their friends.  Below, we introduce
five new ways to weight friends and show that our estimates
of peer influence remain unchanged.  Table 11 shows the
results obtained using the friends of friends not friends of the
ego who live in a city different from where the ego does as
our instrumental variable.  We also center on the mean and
standardize the proportion of friends that adopted the iPhone
3G to facilitate the comparison of the magnitude of the effect
of peer influence across columns.  Column (1) displays the
results obtained before.  Column (2) weights friends ac-
cording to the number of friends they have.  This specification
captures the fact that subscribers may place more weight on
friends that are more connected, which therefore may convey
more information about the new handset.  Column (3) weights
friends according to air time over the entire period of analysis,
which captures the fact that subscribers may give more weight
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Observations 265,462 265,462 265,462
Community FE Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.015 0.015 0.015
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Community cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.























Observations 1,169,364 1,169,364 1,169,364 1,169,364
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes





***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Community cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.

































Observations 265,462 265,462 265,462 265,462 265,462 265,462
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Network tenure, previous handset age, as well as dummies for gender, previous handset technology, regional wage level, type of contract
(pre/post paid), and subscription to mobile internet data plans prior to the release of the iPhone 3G included in all regressions.  std_f rd_adopterst!1
is the same as variable frd_adopterst!1, but mean centered and standardized to facilitate comparison across regressions.  The instrument for
std_frd_adopterst!1 is the mean centered and standardized proportion of i’s friends of friends that are not simultaneously i’s friends and that spend
most of their time in regions with different NUTS-III code than i himself.  Note 2:  Newey estimator standard errors in parentheses.
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Observations 265,462 265,462 265,462
Community FE Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes







***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Community cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
to friends with whom they communicate more often.  Finally,
Columns (4), (5), and (6) weight friends according to the
number of calls and sms exchanged over the entire period of
analysis.  These specifications capture the fact that sub-
scribers may give more weight to friends with whom they
interact more often.  The effect of peer influence remains
positive and highly statistically significant in all specifi-
cations.  Therefore, the effect of peer influence is robust to
how subscribers might weight their friends’ decisions.
Alternative Instrumental Variables
We test the sensitivity of our results to the definition of our
instrumental variable by further exploring the structure of the
social graph.  The first alternative instrument we consider is
the friends of the friends of the ego that are not her friends
and that connect to her only through a single path in the social
graph (ffnf_1path).  Formally, when subscriber i is the ego,
subscriber j is a friend of subscriber k and subscriber k is a
friend of subscriber j not a friend of subscriber k, subscriber
k’s decision to adopt the iPhone 3G is used as an instrument
for subscriber j’s decision to adopt only if there is no
subscriber jN … j that is a friend of both subscriber k and
subscriber i, nor does there exists a subscriber jO that is a
friend of both subscriber k and a friend of a friend of
subscriber i recursively.  Using only one path between sub-
scriber i and subscriber k introduces additional separation
between them, which further reduces the potential for unob-
served 2-hop homophily between egos and instruments.  The
only connection between subscriber i and subscriber k is
through subscriber j, whose decision to adopt the iPhone 3G
is our endogenous variable.
The second alternative instrument we use is the decision to
adopt the iPhone 3G of the weak friends of the weak friends
of the ego that are not her friends (wfwfnf).  Using only paths
in the social graph through weak friends introduces additional
social separation between the instrument and the ego. 
Subscriber j is a weak friend of subscriber i if she is in the
bottom quartile of the distribution of the number of calls and
sms that subscriber i exchanges with her friends throughout
the whole period of analysis.  Using only weak friends helps
further reduce the potential for unobserved 2-hop homophily
between subscriber i and subscriber k.  Table 12 shows the
first stage regressions and the Stock and Yogo tests for weak
instruments.  Despite the separation that these new instru-
ments introduce, they are not weak instruments.  Table 13
shows the second stage results.  Column (1) uses the former
alternative, Column (2) uses the latter alternative, and Column
(3) uses both of them combined.  It is clear that the effect of
peer influence remains positive and highly statistically
significant with similar magnitude across models. 
These results provide additional evidence of the robustness of
our identification approach.  In particular, the alternative
instruments used in this section rely on mechanisms other
than geographical distance to introduce separation between
instruments and the ego.  Yet, all our results agree in terms of
statistical significance and magnitude of the observed effect
of peer influence.
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Observations 265,462 265,462 265,462
Community FE Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates Yes Yes Yes








***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Community clusters robust standard errors in ( ) for probit.  Note 2:  Newey estimator standard errors in ( ) for IV probit.  Note 3:
Community block-bootstrap standard errors in [] for IV probit (200 replications) are used to calculate the significance level.
A Time-Varying Social Network
A central hypothesis of our analysis so far is that social ties
inferred from the CDR data are stable over the whole period
of analysis.  We use stochastic actor-based models for the co-
evolution of network dynamics and behavior (SAMCNDB) to
relax this assumption.  SAMCNDBs are used to model the
dynamics of link formation across the members of a social
network and the relationship between ties and behavior. 
SIENA (Snijders et al. 2010) provides an implementation of
such a model.  It requires at least two snapshots of the social
network and of the behavior of interest.  Actors play a game
that establishes a path from one snapshot to the next.  At each
stage, an actor is selected to take action.  The time between
actions from the same actor is modeled as a Poisson process
with a constant rate, λ, common to all actors.
Two types of actions can occur:
(1) Actors can create or eliminate a tie in the social network.
They do so to maximize the utility given by a function of
the form , fk(B, x) = Σk Bk Sk(x), which is the sum over all
effects k of the utility associated with each effect, Ski(x),
weighted by a scaling factor, Bk .  The utility of an effect
depends on the state of the network, x.
(2) Actors can change their behavior.  In our case, they can
choose to adopt the iPhone 3G.  They do so to maximize
the utility given by a function of the form
, which is the sum over( ) ( )f B x z B S x zi Z Z kZk ki, , ,~~ ~=
all effects  of the utility associated with each effect,
~
k
.  In this case, utility depends on the state of the( )S x zkiZ~ ,
network and the behavior of all actors, z.
Functions S and SZ represent effects that, according to the
theory of social networks, influence the formation of ties and
behavior, respectively, such as transitivity and homophily. 
Borrowing from the econometric theory of random utility
models, SIENA introduces a separable unobservable in the
utility of each actor.  This error term follows a type I extreme
value distribution with mean 0 and a scale parameter
normalized to 1.  Consequently, the probability with which an
actor chooses a particular action follows a multinomial logit
function.  Bk, B
Z
k, and λ parameterize the probability distribu-
tion of a Markov process that captures the dynamics of this
game.  The likelihood function of this process is often
impossible to determine analytically (Snijders,1996).  For this
reason, SIENA estimates parameters using a method of
moments, whose solutions are approximated using Monte
Carlo simulation.
In SIENA, a snapshot of the form [t1, t2] accumulates the
effect of all actions by all actors between the first day of t1
and the last day of t2.
22  We partitioned our data into two
snapshots of the form [1, t] ! [t + 1, 11].  Appendix F shows
22SIENA requires changes in both network and behavior between con-
secutive snapshots to embody enough variance allowing for estimating the
parameters of interest.  Still, these changes cannot be exaggeratedly  large in
order to challenge the assumption that they pertain to a network that evolves
sufficiently  smoothly over time.  For this reason, it is fundamental to
carefully prepare our data for a SIENA  analysis.
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results for all t = 2, 3, …, 9, which are all aligned with the
ones presented below for t = 4, which is the partition for
which SIENA converges in most communities.  This partition
provides a good balance between the two non-overlapping
periods:  1,058 subscribers adopt the iPhone 3G in [1, 4] and
700 do so in [5, 11].  Furthermore, the Jaccard Index for the
networks at t = 4 and t = 11 is 0.816 (with a standard error of
0.050), which provides evidence that a number of social ties
are stable from the first period to the second and thus likely to
entail real social meaning.23
An adjacency matrix, Act is computed for each and every
community, c, at each and every time period, t.  aci
t
j indicates
whether subscriber i called or sent an sms to subscriber j
during time period t.  Vector yct stacks the behavior of interest. 
yci
t indicates whether subscriber i owned the iPhone 3G during
time period t.  We use the following covariates to explain the





measures the overall tendency to form ties that are costly to
establish and maintain; (2) reciprocity, 3jaijaji, controls for the
fact that people tend to return calls and sms from their friends;
(3) transitivity, 3jaij maxh(aih, ahj), controls for triad closure
bias—people tend to communicate more with the friends of
their friends; (4) adoption similarity,  with( )a sim simij ij ij −
simij = 1{yi = yj }, which measures the subscribers’ tendency
to befriend subscribers with similar behavior and thus
captures homophily (Snijders et al. 2010).  Finally, we use
3jaij simij / 3jaij to capture the effect of exposure to the new
handset through friends, which measures the effect of peer
influence.
We use meta-analysis to combine the effects obtained from
running SIENA in each community (DerSimonian and Laird
1986; Hedges and Olkin 1985; Viechtbauer 2010).  A sum-
mary effect for each parameter is obtained using a random-
effects model to allow parameters to vary across communities
(DerSimonian and Laird 1986).  We use a restricted maximum
likelihood estimator and the standard error bias correction
suggested by Paule and Mandel (1982), Rukhin et al. (2000),
and Knapp and Hartung (2003).  Table 14 provides the results
obtained.  The effect of peer influence is positive and highly
statistically significant.  Therefore, we find strong evidence of
peer influence even in the presence of a social network that
changes over time.  The summary effect of homophily is
positive but not statistically significant.  Therefore, we do not
find evidence that homophily played a significant role in the
structure of the diffusion network of the iPhone 3G, that is,
subscribers do not seem to have become friends because they
bought the new handset.  Figure 10 shows the parameters and
the standard errors for influence and homophily in panels (a)
and (b), respectively, for each community analyzed.  The
effect of peer influence is positive in all communities and
statistically different from zero in most of them.  The effect of
homophily is negative and statistically significant in some
communities, positive and statistically significant in other
communities but close to zero and not statistically significant
in most of them.24
Appendix G shows the results for the leave-one-out test
(Viechtbauer 2010) and the cumulative inclusion test (Lau et
al. 1992) for the previous results.  The first test consists of re-
estimating the meta-analysis coefficient repeatedly including
one community at time in the analysis.  The test is sensitive to
the order in which communities are included. Therefore, we
report two liming cases, one in which communities are
included in decreasing order of the standard error associated
with the estimate of the effect of peer influence and another
one in which communities are included in increasing order of
the standard error associated with the estimate of the effect of
peer influence.  In both cases the results converge quickly to
the effect of peer influence reported before.  The second test
shows that this result is not sensitive to removing any one
community from the analysis.
Interpreting the economic meaning of parameter estimates in
SIENA is far from straightforward (Ripley and Snijders
2010).  Still, the log-odds ratio of adoption versus non-
adoption for the effect of peer influence is given by β(A !
Ā)/(A + Ā), where A and Ā denote the number of friends that
adopted and did not adopt the iPhone 3G, respectively, and β
denotes the coefficient obtained.  For a subscriber whose
friends all adopted the iPhone 3G, the odds ratio of adoption
versus no adoption is given by exp(β), which in our case is
23Still, in 30 communities out of the 263 identified earlier, there is no
variation in behavior from the first to the second period.  In the 80 other
communities, the variation in behavior is too little for SIENA to converge. 
We are left with 153 communities, which we analyze.
24We perform a Q-test of heterogeneity (Huedo-Medina et al. 2006) for each
parameter in our model.  The null hypothesis for this test states that the true
value of a parameter is the same across communities.   If this hypothesis is
rejected, then there is evidence of unobserved heterogeneity that explains
differences in parameter estimates across communities that cannot be
attributed to sampling error.  If this is not the case, then the summary effect
can be interpreted  as the true value for the parameter in the population.  We
also report the I² index, which measures the percentage of the total variation
in the effect that is explained by unobserved heterogeneity across
communities.  The Q-test cannot reject the null hypothesis for the effect of
peer influence and the associated I² is essentially zero.  The Q-test shows
evidence of unexplained heterogeneity in homophily across communities. 
Finally,  the Q-test rejects the null hypothesis and the I² is large for out-
degree, reciprocity, and transitivity  and thus there are unobservables driving 
the variation of these three parameters across communities.   Nevertheless,
the coefficients obtained exhibit the expected signs and are statistically 
significant.
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Table 14.  Results of the Meta-Analysis
Variable Coeff Stderr pval I2 H2 τ2 Q-Test
Q-Test
(pval) N Obs
outdegree (density)  -4.414  0.043  0.000 62.851 2.692  0.182 543.708  0.000 153
reciprocity        4.398  0.067  0.000 75.399 4.065  0.448 782.592  0.000 153
transitive ties    2.174  0.034  0.000 51.141 2.047  0.086 345.009  0.000 153
Behavior ö Network  0.043  0.044  0.334 24.219 1.320  0.061 208.778  0.002 153
Network ö Behavior 3.168  0.102  0.000  0.000 1.000  0.000 62.002 1.000 153
Note 1:  Variable Behavior ö Network is captured by the behavior similarity SIENA effect.  Note 2:  Variable Network ö Behavior is implemented
through the behavior average similiraty SIENA effect.  Note 3:  Meta analysis estimated through maximum likelihood assuming a random effects
model with Knapp and Hartung standard error correction.  Note 4:  τ2 is the estimate of the total amount of heterogeneity, I2 is the percentage of
 total variability due to heterogeneity, H2 is .
total variability
sampling variability
Figure 10.  Scatter Plot for the 153 estimates for (a) Peer Influence and (b) Homophily
exp(3.168) = 23.67.  The standard error for this effect is 0.102
and therefore a 95 percent confidence interval in this case is
[19.4, 29.1].  Let p0 represent the probability of adoption of a
subscriber without friends that have adopted the iPhone 3G.
Let p0 represent the additional probability of adoption of a
subscriber whose friends all adopted the iPhone 3G.  Ac-
cording to the results the “IV Probit Results” section pre-
sented earier, p0 = 0.006 and p01 = 0.150.  Therefore, the odds
ratio in this case is given by [(p0 + p01)/(1 ! (p0 + p01)]/[ p0/(1
! p0)] = 30.6.  The standard error for the estimate of p01 is
0.032, therefore a 95 percent confidence interval for this odds
ratio is [16.9, 44.3].  This analysis shows that the effect of
peer influence obtained with SIENA is similar to that obtained
the “IV Probit Results” section using instrumental variables,
which increases our confidence in our results.
The Effect of Cut-Points
We investigate whether variance in the structural properties
of our communities relates to the heterogeneity in adoption
and peer influence across our communities.  Table H1 in
Appendix H shows the descriptive statistics for a number of
well-known structural measures and Table H2 shows that a
number of them are highly correlated.  The most striking rela-
tionship between these measures and adoption arises for cut-
points.  Cut-points are small world bridges that connect
blocks of subscribers that would otherwise be separated.
Figure 11 highlights the role of cut-points in one of our
communities.
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Figure 11.  Cut-Points, Their Friends, and Some Blocks of Subscribers in One Community in Our
Sample
Cut-points serve as pathways for information to flow to these
blocks of subscribers that have no other connection to the
“core” of the community.  Communities with many cut-points
may be more fragile but also less redundant.  Dense networks
with only a few cut-points may trigger inertia and be more
likely to exhibit the status quo, which, in our case, is little
adoption of the iPhone 3G.
Table 15 shows the results obtained from regressing adoption
on a subset of the measures identified in Table H1.  Columns
(1), (2), and (3) in this table show that communities with more
cut-points have higher (monthly) adoption rates, more months
with adoption, and adoption over longer periods of time,
respectively.  The fact that more cut-points is associated with
more adoption over a longer period of time shows the poten-
tially important role of cut-points in spreading information
about the iPhone 3G in these communities.  These results are
obtained after controlling for density, average path length, and
average betweenness.  Together, these covariates measure
how big a community is and how connected its members are.
These covariates exhibit the expected signs in these regres-
sions but only average path length is statistically significant
in the last specification.
We also focus on the relationship between cut-points and peer
influence.  Cut-points can exert more influence over their
friends when the degree of the latter is low.  Otherwise, cut-
points are just one friend among many.  Therefore, we look at
whether the effect of peer influence is different in com-
munities with many cut-points whose friends have low
degree.  Column (4) in Table 15 shows the results obtained
using the coefficient from the SIENA analysis as a measure
of peer influence.  Communities with many cut-points,
namely above the median, exhibit more peer influence.
However, this effect is attenuated by the degree of the friends
of the cut-points.  Therefore, we find suggestive evidence that
cut-points play an important role in adoption and shape peer
influence when their friends have few friends.
Policy Experiments
We test whether EuroMobile could have increased its profit
by seeding the iPhone 3G to appropriate subscribers.  We
code the simulator described in Table I1 in the Appendix I for
this purpose.  This simulator computes the expected number
of additional adopters (AA) as a function of the seeding
strategy (k), the number of seeds (n), an exogenous marginal
effect for peer influence (m) and a model for how consumers
1124 MIS Quarterly Vol. 38 No. 4/December 2014
This content downloaded from 
              158.162.0.2 on Tue, 10 Nov 2020 10:08:28 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Godinho de Matos et al./Peer Influence in a Large Social Network











































High number of cut-points2 4.730**
(2.320)
High number of cut-points *












Observations 153 153 153 153
R² 0.096 0.061 0.047 0.078
Adjusted R² 0.071 0.036 0.022 0.040
Residual Standard Error 0.567 (df = 148) 1.915 (df = 148) 2.068 (df = 148) 1.806 (df = 146)
F Statistic 3.922***
(df = 4; 148)
2.423*
(df = 4; 148)
1.843
(df = 4; 148)
2.057*
(df = 6; 146)
Note 1:  Peer influence measured by the coefficient obtained in the SIENA analysis.  Note 2:  High number of cut-points indicates a community
with more cut-points than the median.  *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
decide whether to purchase the iPhone 3G.  Table 16 defines
the five seeding strategies considered.  These are common
heuristics used in marketing as described in Watts et al.
(2007) and Hinz et al. (2011).  We use the estimate for the
marginal effect of peer influence obtained in the “IV Probit
Results” section in our simulations.  Therefore, they apply
only to treated subscribers as discussed in the “Identification
Strategy” section.
For each set of parameters, we present results for month 11
(T) in our panel.  These results are averages over 1,000
simulations.  We provide three types of results.  Figure 12
shows the number of additional adopters as a function of the
seeding policy, the number of seeds, and the exogenous
marginal effect of peer influence.  We observe that local and
global degree yield the largest number of additional adopters. 
Random seeding performs poorly but global low degree
performs even worse.
Figure 13 shows the cost to revenue ratio C/R that allows
EuroMobile to breakeven as a function of the seeding stra-
tegy, the number of seeds and the exogenous marginal effect
of peer influence when EuroMobile subsidizes 50 percent of
the handset to the seeds (ν = 0.5).25
We observe again that local and global degree perform the
best.  However, the former strategy allows for significantly
higher C/R ratios for small sized campaigns.
Finally, Figure 14 shows the ratio of EuroMobile profits with
seeding relative to no seeding for C/R = 0.526 and ν = 0.5.27
25C is the cost of iPhone 3G to EuroMobile  and R is the price charged by
EuroMobile per handset.  The revenue generated by EuroMobile from
seeding the iPhone 30 is given by AA(R – C).  The cost of seeding is given
by nR(1 – v).  Therefore, EuroMobile breaks even when C /R = 1 –  (1 –
v)n/AA.
26According to iSuppli (http://www.isuppli.com/), the marginal cost of the
iPhone 3G is roughly 50 percent of the revenue.
27The profit with seeding is given by AA(R – C) – nR(1 – ν) whereas the
profit without  seeding must have been AO(R – C).
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Table 16.  Seeding Policy Interventions Tested
Policy t = 0 Policy Description
Random Award the iPhone 3G to a random sample of n subscribers in S
Global Degree Award the iPhone 3G to the n subscribers in S with highest degree
Global
Betweenness
Award the iPhone 3G to n subscribers in S with highest betweenness
Local Degree Randomly select n communities with replacement and at each draw award the iPhone 3G to the
subscriber with the highest degree in that community without and iPhone 3G
Low Degree Award the iPhone 3G to the n subscribers in S with lowest degree
Figure 12.  Additional Adopters as a Function of the Seeding Policy, Marginal Peer Effect, and Number
of Seeds
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Figure 13.  Additional Adopters as a Function of the Seeding Policy, Marginal Peer Effect, and Number
of Seeds
We observe that EuroMobile can hardly benefit from seeding
the iPhone 3G given the modest marginal effects of peer
influence found in this paper.  However, these results are very
sensitive to how much EuroMobile subsidizes the iPhone 3G
to the seeds.  Figure 15 shows that EuroMobile can actually
double its profit by using local or global degree to seed 5,000
subscribers when the marginal effect of peer influence is
twice as much as that observed in our data and the subsidy is
relatively small.
In sum, the effect of peer influence found in this paper is
smaller than other peer effects reported in the literature such
as in Aral and Walker (2011) and Bapna and Umyarov
(2014).  However, the settings in these papers are not directly
comparable to ours.  In particular, we study the effect of peer
influence for an expensive new handset.  It is, therefore,
reasonable to observe a smaller effect of peer influence in our
case.  In fact, our paper shows that the potential of viral mar-
keting strategies for expensive physical products might not be
the same as for inexpensive digital products.  While there
might still be peer influence in the former, ultimately the
decision to adopt lies with each consumer individually and
purchasing expensive products entails significant financial
risks that previous studies have not been able to capture.
Conclusions
This paper complements the literature that looks at contagion
in the case of cheap and free digital goods by studying the
effect of peer influence in the diffusion of a costly physical
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Figure 14.  Additional Adopters as a Function of the Seeding Policy, Marginal Peer Effect, and Number
of Seeds
product.  We argue that the results previously reported in the
literature do not extend to costly products but studying the
latter type of products provides for more realistic settings.  In
particular, it is hard for firms to breakeven when seeding
costly goods to benefit from peer influence.  In these cases,
the effect of peer influence would need to be significant in
magnitude to compensate for the high costs of seeding.  In
this paper we show that while there is peer influence in the
adoption of the iPhone 3G, the magnitude of the effect will
hardly justify seeding iPhones for free.  Firms seeding other
costly products are likely to face similar concerns and thus
think that mass marketing is more appropriate in these cases.
Yet, two additional alternatives might be considered.  One is
to reduce the cost of seeding.  Instead of offering the product
for free, firms can try to offer the product to seeds at a
discount.  This will facilitate breaking even.  However, it may
be hard to convince consumers to purchase costly products
even when these are offered at discounted prices.  Another
approach is to explicitly incentivize peer influence, for
example, offering the product, for free or at a discount, to
seeds that bring friends who may also purchase the product. 
This way, the firm actively rewards peer influence, which is
thus likely to increase to a level that allows for breaking even.
We contribute with a new methodology to measure the effect
of peer influence using observational data, which rests on
identifying tight communities of likely adopters when adop-
tion is a rare event and exploring the structure of the social
network to derive instrumental variables at the individual
level.  We develop a new algorithm capable of identifying
these communities in large network graphs.  This algorithm
can be easily applied in other settings where the product
studied is expensive, which is likely to lead to little adoption.
We work with a major European cell phone provider
(EuroMobile) to study the role of peer influence in the diffu-
sion of the iPhone 3G.  We use call detailed records (CDRs)
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Figure 15.  Additional Adopters as a Function of the Seeding Policy, Marginal Peer Effect, and Number
of Seeds
from millions of EuroMobile users that we follow over a
period of 11 months.  We infer a social graph across users
using these CDRs and identify tight communities of friends
whose majority of calling behavior occurs inside the
community.  We work with 263 non-overlapping communities
comprising 24,131 users of which 1,758 adopted the iPhone
3G.  We posit that the subscribers’ decision to adopt the
iPhone 3G depends on whether their friends adopted this
handset.  Yet, unobserved heterogeneity correlated with
friends’ adoption may render our estimates of peer influence
biased.  We add a number of dummy variables to our model
to control for heterogeneity across regions, across subscribers,
and over time.  Furthermore, we also examine  adoption with
the adoption of the friends of the friends of the ego not friends
of the ego living in cities other than where the ego does.  We
provide a series of results showing the appropriateness and
robustness of this instrument.
We show that if all friends adopt the iPhone 3G, then the
ego’s probability to adopt increases by 15 percent on average.
Using this estimate, we show that peer influence might have
accounted for roughly 14 percent of iPhone 3G sales at
EuroMobile during the 11 months of data we analyze.  We
also use SIENA, which is an implementation of a stochastic
actor-nased model for the coevolution of network dynamics
and behavior, to model a time-varying social network in
which subscribers can adopt the iPhone 3G.  Using SIENA
we find an effect of peer influence consistent both in statis-
tical significance and magnitude with our IV estimates, which
increases our confidence in our findings.  We use different
snapshots of our data to parameterize these simulations and all
of them yield similar results.  Finally, we provide results from
several policy simulations showing that, with the modest
magnitude of the effect of peer influence found in this paper,
EuroMobile would have hardly benefitted from using com-
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mon marketing strategies to seed the iPhone 3G as a way to
accelerate its diffusion.  This finding, however, depends
highly on how much the handset is subsidized to the seeds.
Our paper also comes with limitations.  Our analysis relies on
a single random sample of communities derived from the
CDRs.  While identifying communities is important to control
for unobserved confounders that can drive both adoption and
social proximity, it is still the case that the clustering criteria
we used are not unique and even multiple runs of our samp-
ling strategy could produce different communities which
could, in principle, lead to additional variance in our results.
Yet, we show that most of the algorithms previously used in
the literature to identify communities cannot process real-
world, large social networks.  We use CDRs to proxy social
proximity.  However, we know that subscribers in our sample
must have communicated over other channels, such as face-
to-face meetings, e-mail, Twitter, and Facebook, which we
cannot measure.  In addition, EuroMobile was not the only
wireless provider in the country analyzed and thus the sub-
scribers we analyzed had friends that we could not observe.
Still, the second and the third largest providers in this country
did not launch the iPhone 3G until much later, which reduces
significantly the likelihood of having friends with other
carriers that adopted the iPhone 3G.  Finally, we identify the
effect of peer influence but we are unable to determine the
underlying mechanism by which influence occurs, such as
information transmission, competition, or conformity.
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Appendix A
Modified T-CLAP Algorithm
Our modified version of T-CLAP snowballs from a random adopter with depth d (three, in the case of our paper) and keeps pruning subscribers
from this sample while the resulting community has more than s subscribers (115, in the case of our paper).  H is the social network graph. 
H.  S is the set of subscribers in this graph and A the set of adopters.  The algorithm identifies the subscribers in H that are not adopters with
the lowest IER.  These subscribers are kept in set V.  If V is empty, then the algorithm identifies the subscribers in H that are adopters with the
lowest IER.  These subscribers are kept in V.  This allows us to prune non-adopters with higher probability.  A subscriber from V is then selected
at random and removed from H.  This can, however, separate H into disjoint graphs.  If this is the case, then H keeps only the subgraph with
the highest IER (ties decided at random).
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Table A1.  Pseudocode of the Modified Version of T-CLAP
Variables
G Network graph
A Subset of adopters
d Maximum community 
depth s Target size for communities 
Auxiliary variables
H Network graph
V Set of subscribers
C Set of network graphs
Algorithm
function MTCLAP(G,A,s) - Modified T-CLAP
return NP(G, Snowball(G,random seed, d), A, s)
end function
function NP(G,H ,A,s) - Node Pruning
Compute H .S.IE R
while |H .S| > s do
V = SubscribersLowestIE R(H , A)
H = Subgraph(H ,V \  {v 0 V chosen at random })





V = {H .S(i) \ A :  H .S(i).IE R = min{H .S.IE R}}
if V.S == 0/ then




C = Com ponents(H )
Compute C.IE R
C = {C(k) 0 C :  C(k).IE R = max{C.IE R}}
return {c 0 C chosen at random}
end function
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Appendix B
Computing Our Instrumental Variables
Our dataset contains information that identifies the cellular towers that are used in each and every call placed or received by EuroMobile
subscribers.  Cellular towers are associated with GPS coordinates that allow us to track subscribers through space and time.  For every call
placed or received, we use the GPS coordinates of the cell towers to determine the NUTS-III region where the initiator and the recipient are
located.  We then use the mode of the NUTS-III regions obtained to determine the primary region for each individual (the one where he is most
often observed).  Cell tower ranges can cover from 1 km up to 30 km.  Therefore, there is some uncertainty associated with the true location
of each subscriber, particularly in regions with low population density where there are few cell towers with broad ranges.  On average, we used
753.2 calls to identify the primary region of each subscriber.
NUTS codes (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics)  are statistical divisions of the economic territory use throughout the European
Union designed to develop consistent regional statistics across countries (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/).  We choose NUTS-III for our
analysis because, by construction, NUTS-III represents contiguous municipalities that face similar economic and development challenges and
within which people are likely to move substantially.  We only know the location of a subscriber when she places or receives a call.  Using
NUTS-III ensures that we use large enough regions so that each subscriber moves most of the time within the region rather than between
regions.  Furthermore, we also try to capture the fact that the socio-economic challenges faced by subscribers within the same NUTS-III are
similar.  Figure B1 depicts the number of NUTS-III codes where each subscriber was seen receiving or placing calls.  The average number of
NUTS-III per subscriber, for the entire population of subscribers, is 5.9 with a standard deviation of 4.5.  Still, about 25 percent of the
subscribers were seen placing or receiving calls within a single NUTS-III region.  iPhone 3G adopters were more mobile than the average user
with 10.4 NUTS-III per subscriber on average and a standard deviation of 5.6.  This fact does not affect our separation strategy because looking
in detail at the number of calls that allowed for identifying each subscriber within each NUTS-III, an overwhelming majority of them were
placed or received within the primary NUTS-III region.  This is true both overall and for the iPhone 3G adopters in particular.  This highlights
that people do move around in their daily lives (particularly when considering a large span of time such as 11 months), but they tend to stay
within their primary region most of the time.  Therefore, people with distinct primary (NUTS-III) regions will be clearly separated
geographically almost all of the time.  Figure B2 shows that the average proportion of calls placed within the primary NUTS-III region across
subscribers is 83 percent (median 88 percent) overall and 78 percent (median 82 percent) for iPhone 3G adopters.
Figure B1.  Number of NUTS-III Codes Where Subscribers Received or Placed Calls from August 2008
until July 2009
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Table C1 shows the number of observations included in the regressions reported in the “Results for Peer Influence” section of the paper.  From
the original 263 communities with 24,131 users, we discarded 44 adopters and 241 non-adopters.  These users were removed from the sample
because of missing data for tenure, mobileNet ,and/or the dummies that described the previous handset that they owned.  As a consequence,
5 out of the 263 communities were removed from the sample because they had no adopters.  Including them in the analysis would generate
a problem of complete separation of the outcome (Albert and Anderson 1984).  These 5 communities had 711 subscribers.  An additional 269
subscribers were also removed from the sample because they lived in zip codes where no one else adopted the iPhone 3G.  Again, including
them would lead to a problem of perfect separation of the outcome.  Therefore, we estimate our model using 258 communities with a total of
23,151 subscribers of which 1,714 adopted the iPhone 3G during the period of analysis.




















































Total 263,748 1,714 265,462
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Appendix D
Complete Regression Output
Columns (1) and (2) of Table D1 show the complete regression output for column (3) of Table 7 and column (2) of Table 8, respectively.  The
results for the other models presented in this paper are similar but were omitted due to lack of space.  The signs of the control variables are
consistent with what one would expect prior.  This is true both before and after instrumentation.  People with previous plans of mobile Internet
were more likely to adopt the iPhone 3G.  This is also true for subscribers using handsets 2G or above prior to the release of the iPhone3G.
EuroMobile subscribers that spent most of their daytime in regions with very high or high average wage levels were more likely to adopt than
individuals spending most of their time in regions with wages close to the national average.  The opposite was true for subscribers moving in
low and very low wage regions.  Users subscribing to prepaid tariff plans before the release of the iPhone 3G were less likely to adopt, also
as expected.  The explanation is one of price because in order to buy the iPhone 3G and still remain a prepaid subscriber, consumers needed
to pay the full price of the handset up front.  The alternative would be to change from prepaid to postpaid, but in the country analyzed,
consumers have a clear preference toward prepaid plans (approximately 80 percent of all subscribers are prepaid).
Finally, up to a certain point, network tenure contributed positively to the probability of adoption.  This is likely to indicate that subscribers
required some experience with the services provided by EuroMobile prior to purchasing a phone that would bind them for at least 24 months.
For the sake of readability, note that the dummies dropped from the regression below are genderU, phone2.0g, and geoWageVL.
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Community FE Yes Yes
Zip Code FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R² 0.157
Log Lik -8721
***p < 001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Note 1:  Community clusters robust standard errors in ( ) for Probit.  Note 2:  Newey estimator standard errors in ( ) for IV Probit.  Note 3:  Com-
munity block-bootstrap standard errors in [] for IV Probit based on 200 replications.
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Appendix E
Pseudocode to Estimate Adoption Due to Peer Influence
Table E1.  Pseudocode to Estimate Adoption Due to Peer Influence
Key variables
m Marginal effect of peer (obtained from IV probit)
D(t) Function that returns the marginal effect of time dummies
N(t) Function that returns the number of people who did not adopt the iPhone 3G.  For t = 0 it returns the
sample size.
AVG_FRD_ADP(t) The sample average for frd_adopterst !1
EAI(t) Expected adoptions that occur due to peer influence
Algorithm
for t = 0 6 T do
EAI(t) = N(t)  * (m * AVG_FRD_ADP(t) + D(t))
N(t + 1) = N(t) – EAI(t)
end for
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Appendix F
Additional Time Partitions for the SIENA Analysis
Table F1.  Mean Jaccard Index Across the 263 Communities in the Sample











































[1; 2] – [3; 11] 0.749
(0.056)
[1; 3] – [4; 11] 0.794
(0.052)
[1; 4] – [5; 11] 0.816
(0.050)
[1; 5] – [6; 11] 0.826
(0.046)
[1; 6] – [7; 11] 0.828
(0.045)
[1; 7] – [8; 11] 0.821
(0.045)
[1; 8] – [9; 11] 0.802
(0.048)
[1; 9] – [10; 11] 0.765
(0.051)
[1; 10] – [11; 11] 0.681
(0.058)




11 10 01+ +
denotes the edges that are only present in g0, and e10 denotes the edges that are only present in g1.  Note 2:  Standard errors in ( ).
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Table F2.  Results of the Meta-Analysis Using SIENA for Different Time Partitions



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note 1:  Behavior öNetwork is captured by the behaviorsimilarity.  Note 2:  Network ö Behavior is implemented through behavioraveagesimilarity. 
Note 3:  Meta-analysis estimated through maximum likelihood assuming a random effects model with Knapp and Hartung standard error correction. 
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Table F3.  Results of the Meta-Analysis Using SIENA with Three Snapshots

























































































































Note 1:  Behavior ö Network is captured by the behaviorsimilarity.  Note 2:  Network ö Behavior is implemented through behavioraveagesimilarity. 
Note 3:  Meta-analysis estimated through maximum likelihood assuming a random effects model with Knapp and Hartung standard error correction. 
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Appendix G
Robustness Checks on SIENA Analysis
Figure G1.  Cumulative Inclusion of Communities in Decreasing Order of the Standard Error Associated
with the Effect of Peer Influence
Figure G2.  Cumulative Inclusion of Communities in Increasing Order of the Standard Error Associated
with the Effect of Peer Influence
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Figure G3.  Effect of Peer Influence Leaving One Community Out of the Analysis at a Time
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Appendix H
Community-Level Descriptive Statistics
Table H1.  Definition and Descriptive Statistics for Community-Level Covariates Considered in Our
Study 






















Number of adoptions per month.
Number of months in which adoption took place.


























Number of subscribers (N).
Number of links between subscribers (E).
2e/(n(N – 1).
Longest path between subscribers (no cycles).
 length of the shortest path between i( ) ( )( ) ( )p i j N N p i jji , ; ,− 1
and j.
av_degree 4.61 0.82 3.04 8.96  degree of subscriber i.( ) ( )deg degi N i
i
;








s and t; σst(v) number of such paths through v.






cengralization.deg 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.28 Measures how central the most central subscriber is relative to all
other subscribers .  Cx(pi) is any centrality
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Cx
C p C p













measure of point i and Cx(p*) is the largest such measure in the
network.  Apply this column to the three rows of centralization.
centralizatio.bet 0.54 0.15 0.06 0.85
















Number of closed triplets relative to the number of connected triples to
vertices.
Correlation between W and W²; W is the adjacency matrix.
Number of subscribers that, if removed, separate the community in
more than one component.
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Table H2.  Correlation Table Across the Community-Level Covariates Considered in Our Study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21
(1) adopters 1.00
(2) adoption_rate 1.00 1.00
(3) months_with_adoption 0.85 0.85 1.00
(4) adoption_span 0.57 0.57 0.74 1.00
(5) size 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.29 1.00
(6) density -0.29 -0.29 -0.32 -0.30 -0.75 1.00
(7) avg_path_length 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.28 -0.40 1.00
(8) diameter 0.13 0.13 0.06 -0.00 0.23 -0.29 0.88 1.00
(9) avg_pagerank -0.27 -0.27 -0.32 -0.29 -0.98 0.76 -0.28 -0.22 1.00
(10) avg_coreness -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.00 0.61 -0.24 -0.16 -0.01 1.00
(11) avg_degree -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.06 0.59 -0.30 -0.19 -0.07 0.95 1.00
(12) avg_betweenness 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.67 -0.61 0.86 0.73 -0.65 -0.15 -0.16 1.00
(13) avg_closeness -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.29 0.40 -0.47 -0.47 0.30 0.22 0.27 -0.30 1.00
(14) centralization.deg -0.27 -0.27 -0.29 -0.28 -0.42 0.63 -0.45 -0.33 0.43 0.39 0.44 -0.48 0.41 1.00
(15) centralization.deg -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -005 -0.02 -0.11 0.09 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.21 .13 0.18 -0.04 1.00
(16) centralization.clo -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.16 0.20 -0.47 -0.52 0.16 0.12 0.13 -0.26 0.92 0.27 0.39 1.00
(17) transitivity -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 0.41 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.68 0.48 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.19 -0.04 1.00
(18) transitivity.cor -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.22 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.50 0.32 0.02 -0.08 -0.14 0.16 -0.03 0.78 1.00
(19) cut points 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.33 0.53 -0.71 0.56 0.44 -0.52 -0.41 -0.48 0.65 -038 -0.50 0.15 -0.21 -0.07 00.08 1.00
(20) cut points ff_avg_deg -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.13 0.31 =0.45 -0.38 -0.13 0.56 0.67 -0.20 0.42 0.49 -0.24 0.29 0.04 0.06 -0.38 1.00
(21) logic(cliques_min_size_3) -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.38 -0.12 -0.08 -0.23 0.91 0.87 0.04 0.11 0.31 -0.05 0.05 0.59 0.39 -0.19 0.50 1.00
Appendix I
Policy Simulator Code
Our simulator evolves a graph object over time of the form G(t) = (S(t), W) where S(t) is a set of subscribers and their characteristics and W is
a fixed adjacency matrix.   In our setting S(t, i) = (Xi, Zi,t , BPAt,i, PAt,i, AOt,i, At,i) is a data structure for subscriber i a t time t.  BPA(t, i) represents
the baseline propensity  for subscriber i to adopt the iPhone 3G at time t.  This is given by ( ) ( )( )Φ     . .,α β γ ρ+ + + − ∈X Z WG t S i S AOi i t i 1
and thus introduces heterogeneity across consumers and evolves over time.  G(t) is the graph at time t, S(i) indexes subscriber i in that graph
and AO is the adoption observed for that subscriber in our dataset.  S(i 0 S) refers to a vector of all subscribers in S.  The probability of
subscriber i adopting the iPhone 3G at time t is given by the sum of BPA(t, i) and the effect that additional adopters exert on her, computed
as mWi(G(t ! 1).S(i 0 S).A ! G(t ! 1).S(i 0 S).AO), where A represents whether the subscriber adopts the iPhone 3G in our simulation.  A is
determined using a random draw from a uniform distribution in [0, 1].
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Table I1.  Pseudocode for Policy Simulator
Variables
n number of seeds
m marginal peer influence effect
S set of subscribers
parameters from probit estimation , , , α β γ ρ
W, Xi, Zit covariates in equation 1
AO(i, t) adoptions generated in our dataset
A(i, t) adoptions generated in simulation
BPA(i, t) baseline probability of adoption
PA(i, t) probability of adoption
Algorithm
function AA(n, m, G) – Additional adopters
G(0).S(i 0 I).A = seedingpolicy(n, G(0).S(i 0 I))
for t = 0 6T, i 0 S do
G(t).S(i 0 I).BPA = ( ) ( )( )Φ     . .α β γ ρ+ + + − ∈X Z WG t S i I AOi it i 1
end for
for t = 0 6T, i 0 S:A(i, t) == () do
G(t).S(i).PA = G(i).S(i).BPA + mWi(G(t – 1).S(i 0 I).A – G(t – 1).S(i 0 i).AO)





Albert, A., and Anderson, J. A.  1984.  “On the Existence of Maximum Likelihood Estimates in Logistic Regression Models.,” Biometrika
(71:1), pp. 1-10.
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